The present article illustrates how the main actors in global health governance (GHG)- 
The conflicts between a group of industrialized countries in the "North" and a growing group of emerging economies in the "South" centered around access to ARVs in particular and, eventually, access to medicines for the poor in general. These conflicts provide fascinating insights into the changing pattern of global health governance because they have assumed a multidimensional character and involve-in addition to groups of countries defending and opposing strict IPRs-a large number of civil society organizations (CSOs) networked by the Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) access campaign. 1 When the South succeeded in having the prices of ARVs significantly lowered as a result of negotiations with the TNPCs, the developing countries were also able to reach international agreements to clarify the right to use TRIPS safeguards. These included compulsory licenses 2 and parallel importation used to "protect public health" and, thus, decrease the risk of trade conflicts related to the stringent patent-right protection.
The course of these conflicts points to the changing character of international relations over the last 20 years. Relations between state actors have been increasingly challenged through a densification of global social relations where private actors (CSOs as well as corporations) have a growing impact on the course of events. States remain important as they conclude binding international agreements, provide the hardware of public health care (Fidler 2007) , and thus continue to play a crucial role in pursuing strategies to deal with health issues. Therefore, approaching the issue of access to ARV by analyzing the interaction of public and private actors in global politics as well as in two important developing countries will help us move towards a better understanding of how health problems are tackled in a globalizing society.
We understand global health governance (GHG) as "the totality of collective regulations to deal with international and transnational interdependence problems in health" (Bartsch/Kohlmorgen 2005: 64) . These regulations are, simultaneously, the results of conflictive and cooperative processes and the starting points of new conflicts about specific health policies (such as providing universal access to ARVs). These processes imply "interfaces" between actors with conflicting perceptions, values, and interests due to the systemic contexts in which they operate. This essay will focus on the changing nature of those interfaces and the change in power relationships, which came as a big surprise to both the actors and the observers.
The first part of the essay will start with some theoretical observations concerning the four different kinds of interfaces and their impact on the outcome of global negotiations. This will be followed by an analysis of the IPR-related conflicts linked to the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicines, which basically involve the interests of TNPCs and their impact on government policies in the North. The second part of the paper, focusing on Brazil and 1 The role of global civil society in this conflict is analyzed in more detail in the chapter by Burris et al. in this volume; see also : Sell/Prakash 2004; Hein et al. (2007) . 2 Under WTO rules, a compulsory license allows governments to produce or to grant a third-party authority to produce a drug without consent of the patent holder in cases of national public health emergency, among other limited circumstances (www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm).
South Africa, will examine the different types of interfaces which have driven these conflicts and compromises between national health governance (NHG) and GHG in the context of the global fight against HIV/AIDS. A closer look at the health policies of these two countries in general and their fight against AIDS in particular will make it possible to examine both the power relationships between the North and the South and the nature of the interfaces in some detail.
We will maintain that the NHG of the two regional powers Brazil and South Africa has played a crucial role in determining how global challenges are taken up and how the chances to influence GHG are realized. Their sociopolitical settings have allowed both countries to pursue different objectives in fighting HIV/AIDS and interacting with the global level. In the process, the two countries have changed the very economic and social structure of both their own NHG and GHG.
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Changing Power Relationships and the Role of Interfacing: A Few Theoretical
Considerations
"Interfaces" are (following Long 1989) defined as "socio-political spaces of recurrent interactions of collective actors in the handling of transnational and international affairs" (Bartsch et al. 2007: 30) . An analytical differentiation is made between four major types of interfaces which are closely related to the different types of power employed, that is, legal, resource-based, organizational, and discoursive (ibid.). This differentiation helps to highlight the change in the relative importance of different means of interaction in shaping the financial and economic-as well as the institutional, political, and social-aspects of national and global health governance Actors in global governance have traditionally dealt in two modes of governance, either involving intergovernmental interaction or, in the private sphere, business negotiations. In recent decades, however, cooperation between actors of different types (public-private partnerships, PPPs) has become more and more frequent, constituting hybrid forms of regulation. Moreover, the actors and their actions have been shaped by structural economic, political, and sociocultural conditions. This implies that actors-by virtue of their structural position and role-have certain features, tasks, and resources that affect their capability to execute power. As global governance is primarily regarded as the sum of interactions between actors, it becomes necessary for the empirical study to follow a corresponding approach which is focused on public-private interactions. While the world markets, with their disparities and the potency of certain actors, should be regarded as the framework of the actors' interactions and as the origin of their power, they have only been considered that in a few research efforts (Barnett/Duvall 2005b; Arts 2003) . A study that is focused on power should facilitate a sophisticated analysis that allows for the identification of not only the apparent power of the resource-rich actor but also the potency of "weaker" actors. Based on Bar-nett/Duvall (2005) and on Bas Arts (2003) , who examine the power of non-state actors in global governance, we differentiate between four types of power:
• Decision-making power (refers to the actors' ability to be involved in decision making and in formal norm setting)
• Legal power (the ability to exert power based on legal structures and laws)
• Resource-based power (refers to the actors´ material resources (for example, money, funding) and immaterial resources (knowledge, information) and their ability to provide these resources)
• Discoursive power (the ability to frame and influence discourses)
We will see that these different types of power are closely related to specific types of interfaces between various actors and levels of global governance. There is, however, also a lack of detailed scientific investigation on the meaning of interests in the realm of the global governance. Most authors presume the existence of collective interests. However, this obscures the fact that the actors' self-interests are highly significant in questions regarding which governance structures have to be used and in which manner, how these structures could be modified and redesigned, the extent to which the process of interaction takes a cooperative or conflictive course, and which policy outcomes are feasible under these circumstances.
Followers of the rational institutionalism school (Keohane/Martin 1999) rightly point out that institutions are more than just short-term entities which emerge because of rapid combinations of power and interests but that at the same time their momentum should not be overestimated. They argue that actors and their interest-oriented and instrumental-rational actions are an essential factor in expounding the emergence and function of international institutions. This creates different combinations of common, complementary, or conflictive interests depending upon the position of actors in global and national societies; we will refer below to the differentiation between market-creation interests and welfare-oriented interests, which is of particular importance in global governance processes.
The extent to which individual interests or overarching goals of social welfare determine the actors' behavior is, last but not least, dependent on their logic of action. March/Olsen (1989) have outlined an orientation that is prevalent in rationalist approaches to actor behavior and called it the "logic of consequentialism." This is characterized by individual utility maximization, strategic action, the rational pursuit of interests, and consistent goal-oriented behavior; it basically relates to a "realistic" pursuance of self-interest which might be based on an actor's position in the economic system and possibly also on the fight for political power.
Social integration, however, depends on more than just complying with rules because of the self-interested desire to avoid punishment. March and Olson confront the logic of consequentialism with a "logic of appropriateness" which assumes that actors behave according to overarching norms and do what they believe is considered appropriate in the eyes of other actors. Risse (2000) supplements these "logics" with the "logic of arguing," implying that actors exchange arguments on causal and normative contexts through a communicative process and act according to the results of such a process of understanding. This implies that even in the realm of rational action-discarding the emotional/affective binding forces of a community-society depends upon a logic of collective understanding which works independently from a continuous reference to long-term self-interest.
Seen in relation to processes of global governance, these considerations mean that we have to take into account a certain combination of actors primarily following a logic of consequentialism and other actors following the logics of appropriateness and/or arguing. It would be a mistake to relate actors in the economic field and in the social field simply to the first and the second logic, and also to assume that one actor is always following the same type of logic (for example, corporate social responsibility). The formation of a global society implies not only states pursuing their national interests and transnational actors pursuing their collective interest to create global rules-which allow them to pursue their private interests globally (critical interpretations of WTO)-but also the strengthening of advocative actors pushing human rights and supporting "health for all" politics in order to create the necessary confidence for global cooperation.
Analyzing interfaces thus implies describing and examining the actors involved in global governance interactions in their original structural contexts, that is, their sets "of reference points and constraining/enabling properties" (Long 2001: 62) . Interfaces represent the intersections of modes of life, worldviews, interests, and strategies in which power relations are important for the emergence of new institutional contexts. As we are particularly interested in the impact different actors have on shaping institutional change and policy outcomes in GHG, we propose a typology of interfaces in relation to the types of power, namely, decision-making, legal, resource-based and discoursive power. There is a certain congruence between types of power and specific types of interfaces.
Certainly, it makes sense to talk of discoursive interfaces when considering not only the role of mass media but also the importance of expert commissions that produce reports intended to shape the perspectives of influential persons on important political issues (thus constituting the use of discoursive power). In addition, there are resource-transfer interfaces involving the relationships between donors (countries, foundations) and international governmental organizations on the one hand, and the latter type of organization and receiving countries or other actors on the other hand. With respect to decision-making power, it seems useful to distinguish organizational interfaces, that is, decision-making structures in relevant organizations and institutions. Legal interfaces are created not only by international law (and are a specific outcome of processes at organizational interfaces)-which is exercised by international bodies monitoring compliance with this law (such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body)-but also by national courts when dealing with international law incorporated into national law (for example, patent law following TRIPS rules). We define discoursive, organizational, legal, and resource-transfer interfaces as follows:
• Discoursive interfaces are communications about a basic understanding of, but also on, strategies to deal with the issues that arise in interactions between different levels of politics and different types of actors. These strategies might involve programmatic elements if longer-ranging concepts of cooperation and problem-solving are developed.
• If these programs are related to existing or newly created organizations, organizational interfaces appear, which in the case of international/global organizations typically comprise actors from the international and national levels of politics (partnerships, participation in organization and/or decision-making bodies, operational cooperation, consolidated programmatic cooperation).
• Organizational interfaces, depending on the nature of the organization, might also include legal interfaces, which are structured through international and national law (actors attempting to influence legislative processes and negotiations, the implementation of law, legal conflicts, and international agreements).
• Resource-transfer interfaces play a particularly important role in the transfer of finances to poor countries, and, of course, in financial transfers from rich countries to multilateral organizations in various fields of social politics. Resource-based interfaces also arise as a strategy to defend specific regulations (or the prevalence of specific political regimes) against irrefutable criticism, for instance, from a human rights perspective. Therefore, the US and other developed countries with strong interests in protecting IPRs looked at the enforcement and dispute settlement system which existed within GATT and which was to be further developed in the context of the WTO agreements. Within the context of that institutional setting it was possible to put pressure on advanced developing countries, which were known not only to copy and reengineer innovations, but also to have been successful in exporting those more sophisticated products all over the world. In the pharmaceutical field the increasing competition of international generic producers, which circumvented the strict patent laws of the US and other OECD countries, was increasingly perceived as hurting sales of patented drugs, both at home and abroad.
Moving the focus of implementing international IPR rules from WIPO to TRIPS represented the first round of "forum shifting" in this field, which means an attempt to shift the main thrust of an actor (or a group of actors) fighting for an international agreement serving its developing countries' increasing involvement in the international negotiating process on matters touching on health governance has been a constant feature of negotiations on the "amended" TRIPS Agreement. While we will discuss the latter process referring to the example of legal and organizational interfaces in Brazil and South Africa, it can already be stated that the very process of getting the TRIPS Agreement amended represented a paradigm shift in international negotiations, not only because the "voices of the poor" were heard but also because their requests were legislated.
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The TNPCs, TRIPS, and AIDS
Summary Sequence of the TNPCs' Interfaces
The interactions between TNPCs and the other major actors in the global and national health arena have been analyzed in more detail in earlier contributions; Companies such as GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Merck used different packaging and/or bottling and embossing of their tablets for their HIV/AIDS medication than for the same pills sold in rich countries. They also provided a different number of pills per package.
resource-based power and that they have also become increasingly involved in the decision making and formal norm-setting of GHG-that is, in using legal interfaces. 9 As a consequence of that involvement, the TNPCs found themselves in a number of interfaces, ranging from legal ones-encounters with the South African government in the country's courts and the drafting and discussion of the TRIPS legislation with the USTR-to organizational and discoursive interfaces. The latter types of interfaces played an important role in the fight over drug pricing with Brazil's government and NGOs as well as in key discussions with public and private partners and opponents. In both cases TNPCs were involved through their major associations at the national and international level (PhRMA and IFPMA) and via the top executives of the major companies. They also used resource-based interfaces, utilizing their vast financial resources on all fronts. Most of the encounters were really a combination of at least two or three types of interfaces. By putting too much emphasis on the legal interfaces at the beginning of the discourse on access to medicine in poor countries, they did not achieve the expected results, as they admitted quite openly afterwards. 10 9
For a discussion of the direct involvement of the TNCs in national and global politics, see Sell (2000) and Jawara/Kwa (2003).
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The Economist (2005b).
TNPCs' Strategies and the Response from Brazil and South Africa
Analysts within the pharmaceutical industry have long used game theory when providing strategic advice to management. In deciding among alternative research projects, which not only face a significant risk of failure but also the possibility of strong competition, even after many years of successful R&D, management is well advised to use this approach to help choose which projects to sponsor and which to drop or delay. 11 In the case of internationalizing IPRs, the TNPCs chose the regime-shifting strategy, which they considered to be secure since it had the backing of the US government. That strategy did seem to work well at the beginning, when the shift of a new legal and enforceable base for IPRs from WIPO to the WTO was accomplished without major opposition.
By simultaneously pressing for the internationalization of IPRs at WIPO (into which the US government introduced the Sustained Patent Treaty (SPT)), attaining the successful introduction and legislation of the TRIPS Agreement at the WTO, and insisting on even tougher IPR regulations (TRIPS+) in various bilateral treaties, the governments of the North in general and the US Trade Representative in particular followed the script designed by the hightech Transnational Corporations (TNCs), among which the TNPCs played a crucial role. 12
The TNPCs' success on the national front encouraged Brazil and the NGOs to also play an increasingly more active and demanding role in the international global health arena along legal interfaces, and to mobilize discoursive ones. The outcomes of these activities were two initiatives within WIPO and WHO. In 2004, under the leadership of Argentina, Brazil, and Kenya, the developing countries pushed for negotiations on a "development agenda" within WIPO and a medical R&D treaty within WHO; these initiatives were intended to provoke further discussion on the value of and the best timing of IPRs legislation in developing countries (see Figure 1 ).
By also using the strategy of forum shifting, the South countered the initiatives of the North with an increasing number of initiatives which transferred the limelight of global health issues from the WTO to the WHO, where it would seem to belong. The scenario depicted in Figure 1 illustrates the multiple interfaces among the major actors in the health arena of today. From earlier discussions regarding the TNPCs' interactions with and influences on the governments of the North, in lobbying for the internationalization of IPRs in various fora, and the response from the developing countries, fighting for an amendment to TRIPS and introducing new initiatives at WIPO and the WHO, it has become clear that the major pillars of the global health architecture are in the process of significant change. For an extensive discussion of the TNPCs' role in drafting the TRIPS Agreement, see Sell (2000) .
ter two of which would previously never have been anticipated to become part of wideranging discussions and decisions concerning global health issues in the twenty-first century. Brazil and South Africa have faced major HIV/AIDS crises, with "important aspects of the epidemic following a similar pattern in both countries" (Gauri and Lieberman, 2004: 2) .
While experts predicted a major expansion of the disease in both countries in the mid-1980s, Brazil has been able to keep the prevalence rate at less than 1 percent of its population (UNAIDS, 2004: 202) . The 660,000 estimated HIV cases in Brazil contrast with 5.54 million HIV-infected South Africans, who constitute close to 11 percent of the country's population (Doherty and Colvin 2004: 196) . Table 2 because of governmental reluctance to formulate a comprehensive national HIV/AIDS program. During the first years of the epidemic NGOs remained, together with some local governments, the protagonists of prevention and care (Galvão 1994: 341-352) . 13 In these efforts The World Bank projects were a watershed-quantitatively and qualitatively-since they induced a high degree of commitment on the part of the government and included decisive financing of NGOs. There was a dramatic expansion of federal government program expenditures for HIV/AIDS/STD 16 treatment, in addition to ARV and other drugs, after the bank had begun to disburse. The World Bank helped not only through financing capacity building and creating facilities at the state and municipal levels, but also through financing prevention projects run by CSOs, thus consolidating one component of the overall Brazilian of NGOs has since then mainly been financed by the federal government, which has channeled funds from World Bank projects to them.
14 "The promise of treatment gave an incentive for more at-risk individuals to be tested and gave doctors an incentive to report AIDS cases, thus improving surveillance and prevention programs" (Berkman et al. 2005 (Berkman et al. : 1170 . For instance, the implementation of BHAP in 2001 required an investment of US$232 million, but was estimated to result in total savings of US$1.1 billion (thanks to the reduction of hospitalization and other costs).
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The minister of health, José Serra (1998 Serra ( -2002 , maintained somewhat dryly in an interview: "The bank's participation was positive for it obliged us to do something well organized to make an efficient management and accounting effort" (see J. Biehl, 2004 Particularly in the foundation period (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) , CSOs working on HIV/AIDS relied heavily on sources from abroad, such as the Ford Foundation, Misereor, Brot für die Welt, and they worked actively along discoursive interfaces with international CSOs.
The financial and discoursive interfaces have also been intense between the Brazilian business sector, government, and civil society. As part of the BHAP the Brazilian National AIDS Council (CEN) has not only been active in supporting workplace programs within its membership, but it has also played an important global diffusion function in disseminating the best practices of those programs on the shop floor. It was in that context that multinational 17 The relevance of this qualitative contribution is reflected in the prevention component, for which the bank lent US$253m in the period 1994-2003. The federal government alone spent a total of US$290m in 2000 for ARV drugs purchasing, which was 69 percent of total federal spending on AIDS in 2000 (Beyrer et al. 2005: 28) . It would have been difficult for the Brazilian government to spend so much for treatment over all the years if the World Bank had not covered the prevention component so massively. While public-private partnerships developed in Brazil in order to prevent and treat AIDS in business and industry, the private sector was on its own in South Africa. Without entering into the discussion of whether businesses' reaction has been adequate to the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS problem, it can be safely said that the highly publicized workplace programs of such important enterprises as the Anglo-American mining company, the parastatal power utility Eskom, and the multinational car manufacturers DaimlerChrysler, BMW, and Volkswagen-beyond a having a very specific impact among the firms' employees and their families-set a publicly visible example and thereby influenced South Africa's HIV/AIDS policy. 22 Civil society was less constrained and interacted significantly with other actors, at both the national and the international level. TAC most actively forged networks with international nongovernmental organizations (INGOS) and international organizations which had a significant impact on GHG. In cooperation with its partners, TAC organized international protests supporting South Africa's government in the court case of the Pharmaceutical Manu-
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The main sources were Bread for the World, the Open Society Foundation, the Swedish International Development Agency, Oxfam, and the Ford Foundation. Only one donor, the AIDS Foundation of South Africa, is based in the country (TAC 2005) . The full list of donors along with a detailed analysis can be found in Mbali (2005: 22-23) .
22
For case studies on workplace programs in two large South African companies, see Stevens (2004) . On workplace programs in South Africa, see also Marais (2000: 30) and Butler (2005: 11 The legal battle between Brazil and the United States over pharmaceutical patent rights had strong repercussions for both GHG and NHG. The association of the US pharmaceutical industry (PhRMA) had started to lobby against the Brazilian patent law, which excluded medical products from patent protection, as early as 1988 (Marques 2002 : 43, Tachinardi 1993 . Only after severe commercial sanctions had been undertaken in 1990, through punitive customs duties on selected Brazilian export products (Silva 2005: 131) , did the Brazilian government, in 1996, issue a revised patent law which included the protection of pharmaceutical products.
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In its campaign tactics, TAC has learnt from the US-based NGO AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) (Schneider 2001: 18) . This provides further evidence of the strong interaction of NGO actors from the national and the global level through discoursive interfaces.
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The resolution was passed by a 52-0 vote with only one abstention (Wogart & Calcagnotto 2006: 96; Galvão 2002: 219) . One month later, the WHO World Health Assembly, following a Brazilian proposal, also confirmed "the right to health and that the progressive realisation of that right in the context of HIV/AIDS involves access to treatment" (ISHR 2001). which was based on the legal provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, was supported by the United States government, which threatened to impose trade restrictions on South Africa (Lanoszka 2003: 191-192) . It targeted the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, signed by President Mandela in December 1997, which gave the South African minister of health the power to allow both compulsory licensing and parallel importation 26 of patented medicines in general and of antiretroviral drugs in particular (Kühl 2002: 76) . Responding to intense national and international public pressure and with only a slim chance of winning the case, the 39 TNPCs represented by the PMA backtracked from the case in late 1998 (Weissman 2001) .
In January 2001 the lawsuit was reinstated. The chances for a victory on the part of the pharmaceutical manufacturers were now considerably better, because South Africa was now obliged to fully comply with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement (Kühl 2002: 76) . The
TNPCs maintained that the case was not directed against South Africa's efforts to seek price reductions for antiretroviral medicine. That, however, was exactly the impression that AIDS high ARV prices and promoted the human right to access to essential medicines. According to Gauri and Lieberman (2004: 27) , both countries "have styled themselves as emboldened leaders of the developing countries in this regard."
Closely related to the legal interfaces are the organizational interfaces, the use of which acts as a crucial indicator for the degree of cooperation between the national and the global level of health governance. Once more, while Brazilian policy makers had made extensive use of those opportunities even before the threat of AIDS required some degree of organizational interface, South Africa's use of organizational links had been much more restrained, an approach which became even more isolationist during the AIDS crisis in the 1990s.
Since the 1970s, the WHO has developed multiple initiatives with Brazilian health authorities and academic institutions through its regional representative, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). These joint activities laid the conceptual basis for the reform of the Brazilian health system in the 1980s and 1990s. That in turn shaped the Brazilian BHAP (Lima 2002: 92-93; Fontes 1999: 113-114) . With respect to the BHAP, the nature of these organizational interfaces was not always without conflicts. There were at times divergent conceptions about the mode of resource-transfer interfaces ("authoritatively" earmarked resource allocations) and global and national policies and strategies in the field of HIV/AIDS, particularly prevention programs such as harm reduction and public campaigns. In the early 
Resourcebased
Heavy reliance on foreign financing for public health in 1980s and 1990s (debt crisis; public health free of charge), incl. state and federal HIV/AIDS programs (since 1983).
Government's health budget not constrained by high indebtedness. Significant global financing for government programs only since 2000, treatment programs since 2003.
Since the 1980s civil society's human rights discourse for integrated prevention-treatment approach (dialogue between national and global NGOs and all levels of government).
Since the 1980s civil society's human rights discourse for integrated preventiontreatment approach has been developed through dialogue between national and global NGOs.
Discoursive
Early responsiveness of states (since 1983) and, progressively, federal government (since 1985, except 1990-1992) to civil society pressure for the integrated prevention-treatment approach. Source: Authors' compilation.
Conclusions
The examination of the fight against AIDS and the confrontation over ARV prices between Brazilian and South African government representatives, supported by local and global civil society groups, and the TNPCs and government agencies of the North reveals a number of points which could be important for future policy decisions.
• First, the seemingly all-powerful transnational corporations were forced to negotiate and retreat vis-à-vis two developing countries in view of a global health crisis. While the importance of the NGOs' involvement is undeniable and has been cited here and elsewhere, the emergence of strong national health governance in Brazil and the successful opposition of both Brazil and South Africa to a narrow, TNPC-oriented interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement were crucial examples for other developing countries to also defend their own interests in GHG in a more self-assertive manner. At the same time, the successful stance of CSOs against the South African government points to the strength of global civil society in the case of health issues and to the fact that conflicts on access to medicines are not fought along ideologically hardened North-South lines alone. 30
• Second, these accomplishments were achieved through the artful use of different interfaces, the combination of which made the change possible. Important as it was as a first step, defending presumed "national interests" along legal interfaces was a necessary but not sufficient condition for changing the rules and regulations of GHG; change was ultimately accomplished by using opportunities and reacting to challenges along resourcebased, organizational, and especially discoursive interfaces in the multilevel global polity. As a consequence, future developments in NHG and GHG will require policy makers to consider using the multiplicity of interfaces in order to achieve comprehensive solutions to global health issues.
• Third, it is impossible to clearly separate the various interfaces utilized during the protracted conflict, but each played a prominent part at some stage of the multiple negotiations between 1995 and 2008.
-TRIPS, the legal interfaces in the South African courts, and the agreements negotiated in Geneva played a crucial role in supporting Brazil's legal battles and its claims for access to low-cost medicines.
-The increasing global involvement in the fight against HIV/AIDS permitted Brazil to fully engage in a number of organizational interfaces, which helped not only that country but also other emerging economies sort out their concerns and push the countries of the North to reconsider their positions concerning global health issues.
-Resource-based interfaces played a different role in each country. Once convinced to make the fight against the pandemic a top priority, the Brazilian federal government 30 In that context it is interesting to note the substantial amount of US financial support for AIDS programs (PEPFAR) and the meetings President Bush had with Brazilian president Lula to help fight AIDS in Africa.
was in a position to negotiate the terms of cooperation with major financial donors and creditors. In contrast, South Africa's financial independence and the government's specific stance with respect to the treatment of HIV/AIDS helped it to determine its health policies independently-alas, at a high price.
-Accomplishments at the negotiating tables were strongly supported by discoursive power, which was first used successfully by civil society at all levels but which government representatives and the TNPCs also increasingly engaged in. The number of papers and reports issued by the industry's national and international associations, some of them written by international think tanks, signaled an increased willingness to enter into discoursive interfaces on a quasi-academic level.
• Fourth, the rapid response of the TNPCs represents a move into a new round of confrontation which will challenge the participants to further engage in multiple interfaces. Re- Eventually, a new and enlarged set of legal norms should emerge from the organizational, financial, and discoursive interfaces described above. That in itself should simplify and clarify the roles of the various actors in the changing field of global health. As described earlier in this paper, the first steps in that direction have been undertaken; they are waiting to be supplemented and coordinated through further agreements on the emergence of an improved GHG.
